write a pro and con essay about Aristotle

1. choose an argument from Aristotle’s ethics( from the file I will upload )2.check http://www.iep.utm.edu/aristotl/#H7 for more info about the argument3. follow the form I upload exactly , write the pro if you’re pro and con if you’re con both are in the format.4.make sure its exactly 5 pages not more nor less. double spaced 12 times new roman5.you MUST give real life examples, the Last paragraph connecting to the world today, how is Aristotle relevant today?6. remember this is not a summary
aristotle_s_ethics_in_eight_outlines.doc

the_pro_and_con_essay_format.docx

Don't use plagiarized sources. Get Your Custom Essay on
write a pro and con essay about Aristotle
Just from $13/Page
Order Essay

Unformatted Attachment Preview

An Overview in Eight Outlines of
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics
Book One Chapter 1 (= 1.1) All deliberative/methodological actions are about normative
goodness.
1.7 The human good is the soul actively and excellently expressing reason.
1.10 The noble man’s happiness does not fall easily away and, once diminished, does not
easily return.
2.5 Virtue is an active state that is achieved by rationally choosing the mean.
3.1 Moral praise or blame can only be accorded to voluntary actions; involuntary actions
due to force or ignorance of particulars occasioned by pain and regret mitigate blame.
5.1-7 [Justice is: (a) a relational virtue—law abidingness, and (b) a proper virtue via
distribution and retribution; these together may be understood as a mean between doing
and suffering injustice.]
7.3-7 Though there may be instances of bestiality and insanity as reasons for evil action,
in the main it is akrasia and asophrosune with the latter being more blamable than the
former.
8.3 [Friendships based upon utility or pleasure are not enduring.]
1
Aristotle’s Ethics in Eight Outlines
“All deliberative/methodological actions are about normative goodness”
Book One. Chapter One 1094a 1-3
1. All deliberative/methodological actions are about something—F
2. [Any action that is about something is purposive]—F
3. All deliberative/methodological actions are purposive—1,2
4. [Purposive actions are about their purposes]—F
5. [A purpose is an end]—F
6. Purposive actions and deliberative/methodological actions are about an end—3-5
7. [“To aim” is to exhibit a purpose]—F
8. “To aim” is about an end—6,7
9. [“To aim” characterizes all deliberative/methodological actions]—Assertion
10. All deliberative/methodological actions are about an end—8,9
11. All ends are good—A
12. [“Good” means either: (a) “satisfaction of” (a functional concept) or (b) “approval
of” (a normative concept)]—F
13. [“Good” in this context means “approval of”]—A
_________________________
14. All deliberative/methodological actions are about normative goodness—10-13
2
Aristotle’s Ethics in Eight Outlines
“The human good is the soul actively and excellently expressing reason”
Book One. Chapter Seven, 1098a 8-17 (argument eta)
1. The human good is to express one’s function via active reason—F (from zeta,
#11)
2. The high degree of functional expression is excellence—F
3. A function is to eu when it is completely fulfilled—A
4. [By nature] all aim at excellence—A
5. The human good is to actively express reason excellently—1-4
6. The soul expresses human action—A
7. The good is doing excellently—F
___________________
8. The human good is the soul actively and excellently expressing reason—5, 6, 7
3
Aristotle’s Ethics in Eight Outlines
“The noble man’s happiness does not fall easily away and, once diminished, does not
easily return”
Book One. Chapter Ten, 1100b 24-1101a 13
1. Many events are the result of chance (tuche). F.
2. A small ‘chance benefit’ affects one’s life little; a large ‘chance benefit’ affects one’s life
a lot. F. [b25]
3. Large ‘chance benefits’ make one’s life more blessed 1,2
[b 26]
4. Large ‘chance un-benefits’ make one’s life less blessed.3. [b30]
5. The kalon person bears un-benefits well. F. [b31]
6. To bear un-benefit well is to make the best out of a bad situation. F. [b35-1101a6]
7. [Making the best of a bad situation puts one above a person who does not.] F.
8. [The truly miserable (athlios) is fully defeated by an un-benefit.] F.
9. The noble man who suffers misfortune is never truly miserable 5-8. [a7]
10. The noble man who suffers misfortune is never truly blessed. 4.
11. [The noble man’s state is not to change easily: up or down. cf. a10]
_______________
12. The noble man’s happiness does not fall easily away and, once diminished, does not
easily return. 9-11. [a13]
4
Aristotle’s Ethics in Eight Outlines
Virtue is an active state that is achieved by rationally choosing the mean
EN Book 2, Chapter 5
110b 20-1107a 9
1. [Virtue must be defined in terms of a condition of the human soul]–Assertion
2. There are three conditions of the human soul: feelings (pathos), capacities (dunameis),
and states (hexis)—A/1105b 20
3. Virtue must be defined in terms of feelings, capacities, or states–1,2/1105b 22
4. [Virtue involves the proper attribution of praise or blame]–Fact
5. Feelings imply being affected by something having to do with pleasure and pain (such
as appetite, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, love, hate, longing, jealousy, pity, et al.)—
A/ 1105b 23
6. We undergo feelings in the sense of being moved by them—A/ 1105b 30-1106a 7
7. We say someone is excellent when he [rationally] moves not when he is being
moved—A/ 1106a 7
8. We only praise or blame someone when he is excellent—A/ 1106a 1
9. We do not praise or blame someone who is being moved–7,8/ 1105b 30
10. [We do not praise or blame someone due to his feelings]–9,6, 5
11. Virtue is not feeling–10, 4/ 1105b 30
12. We possess capacities by nature—F/ 1106a 10
13. [We are not praised or blamed for what we possess by nature]–F
14. Virtue is not a capacity–12, 13, 4/ 1106a 8
15. Virtue must be a state–3,11,14/ 1106a 15
16. Virtue is a good state that is functionally excellent–15 + argument from BK One./
1106a 20-25
17. There exists in everything continuous the states of “the more,” “the less,” and “the
5
equal”(aka the mean)—A/ 1106a 27
18. In atheletic training “the equal” is preferred to the more or the less—Fact/1106a 321106b 7
19. [Atheletic training, a.k.a. medicine, a.k.a. the science of the body’s health, is a good
metaphor for the soul’s health]–A
20. Craftsmen also prefer the equal to the extremes—Fact/ 1106b8-17
21. [The crafts analogy is a good analogy for achieving excellence]–A
22. Moral excellence is to be achieved through pursuing the equal (the mean)–16-21/
1106b 26
__________________________________
23. Virtue is an active state that is achieved by rationally choosing the mean–7, 15, 22/
1107a 1
6
Aristotle’s Ethics in Eight Outlines
“Moral praise or blame can only be accorded to voluntary actions; involuntary actions due
to force or ignorance of particulars occasioned by pain and regret mitigate blame”
Book 3, Chapter One, 1109b 30-1111a 24
1. Virtue is about feelings and actions–Fact (from previous argument)/ 1109b 30
2. People are only praised or blamed when they act voluntarily—Fact/1109b 32
3. A treatise on virtue must include an examination of the voluntary–1, 2/ 1109b 33
4. The causes of some action being involuntary are: force and ignorance—A/ 1110a 1-5
5. Force can be absolute or mixed—F/ 1110a 5-10
6. In the case of a tyrant threatening your family [in order to make you do something
shameful] or throwing a precious cargo overboard, there is a mixture of the voluntary and
force—A/ 1110a 5-10
7. In order for praise or blame to be assigned to a mixed case it must be assumed that
“force” is minimal or at least outweighed by one’s own volition—A/ 1110a 20-35
8. [Only in absolute force cases is one entirely blameless, otherwise, one can achieve
praise or blame in proportion to his ability to act or not to act relative to the alternative]-5,6,7
9. To act in ignorance is to be unaware—F/ 1110b 18
10. [To feel pain and regret means that if one had the relevant information, i.e., was
aware, he would not have acted in this way]–F
11. When one acts shamefully in ignorance and later becomes aware he will either feel
pain or regret or not–9, 10/ 1110b 20
12. [In some cases, such as anger or drunkenness, one is ignorant due to a fault in the
agent that creates ignorance of the universal rule]–A
13. [A fault in the agent mitigates the protective veil of ignorance]–A
14. To act in ignorance due to a fault in the agent mitigates the protective veil of
ignorance that may block an agent’s understanding of the universal rule–12,13/ 1110b 257
1110b 30
15. [One can only be ignorant of universals or particulars]–A
16. [Premise 12 describes the only sort of way that one is ignorant of the universal]–A
17. When one is ignorant such that it mitigates his moral blame, the ignorance concerns
particulars–14-16/ 1111a 1
18. To be ignorant of particulars may mean being ignorant of: a) who is doing it, b) what
he is doing, c) about what or to what he is doing it, d) what he is doing it with, e) for what
result the action is being performed, f) the way that the action is being performed, e.g.,
gently or hard—A/ 1111a 3-6
19. [The list in premise 18 constitute ways a person can be ignorant in a relatively
blameless way]–A
20. For an action to be involuntary due to ignorance, one must be ignorant of the
particular and feel pain and regret–11, 17, 18, 19/ 1111a 20-24
_____________________
21.
Moral praise or blame can only be accorded to voluntary actions; involuntary
actions due to force or ignorance of particulars occasioned by pain and regret mitigate
blame–2, 3, 4, 8,11, 17, 20
8
Aristotle’s Ethics in Eight Outlines
Justice is: (a) a relational virtue–law abidingness and (b) a proper virtue via distribution
and retribution; these together may be understood as a mean between doing injustice and
suffering injustice
Book Five. Chapters 1-7, 1129a 32-1134a 7
1. In common opinion the just man is both a law abider and is fair (the opposite is true of
the unjust man)—F/1129a32-1129b2
2. [Common opinion yields ethical principles]–A
3. The just man is both a law abider and is fair–1,2
4. To be a law abider (in a general sense) means to adhere to laws that contribute to the
public good—A/ 1129b12-19
5. The public good produces and maintains happiness for its members—A/ 1129b 19-21
6. [The just man (in a general sense) is a law abider who adhers to laws that produce and
maintain happiness for its members–4,5
7. The just man (in a general sense) produces and maintains happiness for others by
fulfilling or completing another virtue—A/ 1129b 20-30
8. [Whatever applies to a large number of categories as an element of completion is not-strictly speaking–a virtue in its own right but a relational virtues]–A
9. General law abiding justice is a relational virtue–6,7/ 1129b 30-38
10. Justice as fairness is a distributional concept—A/ 1131a 8-20
11. Distribution questions admit a proper mean between “too much” and “too little”—F/
1131a 17
12. [Whatever admits a proper mean is a haplos virtue as opposed to a relative virtue]–A
13. [Distributive justice is a haplos virtue]–10,11
9
14. Distributive justice as a concept requires the people to whom the good will be
distributed and the good to be distributed—F/ 1131a 18-20
15. When all things are equal each party should receive an equal share—A/1131a 23
16. When all things are not equal then each party should receive a proportionate share—
A/ 1131a 30
17. [Egalitarianism should only be deviated from via compelling reasons and further
distributions ought to be according to the proportionate share]–14-16
18. Sometimes distributions are not fairly made, i.e., someone gets more than his share or
something he is not entitled to—F/ 1131a 25-1132a
19. [Fairness dictates creating a balance (the proper mean) when an imbalance occurs]–F
1132a5-7
20. [Rectificatory justice is that aspect that aspires to recreate balance (the mean)]–F
21. When an imbalance occurs a judge should act to recreate balance (the mean)–18-20/
1132a 7 [compare to the discussion on numerical equality 1132a 25-1132b 20. Also note
the discussion on the Pythagorians who were said to be in favor of such a mathematical
approach 1132b 23-33. This mathematical approach is extended through the principle of
proportionality 1132b 33-1132b 27.]
22. In the political realm the agents who we are considering are those who are equal and
free (and seek self-sufficiency)—A/ 1134a 27-29
23. [Reason is disinterested]–A
24. [Humans apart from their reason are self-interested]–F
25. [We all want rulers who look out for the interests of all, i.e., are just]–A/ cf. #4-6
26. Rulers should rule from reason and not from their own interests–23-25/ 1134a 351134b 4
27. [When agents are not equal or free, then there is something like justice, but not
justice proper]–22
28. [Law abiders and law makers are both constrained by justice–as a relational virtue]-27, 6, 9, 27
29. [Justice as fairness includes distributive and retributive justice as it seeks a proper
mean]–21, 17, 13
10
30. Taken as a whole injustice defines the perameters of doing justice are defined in
terms of its opposite, injustice—A/ 1134a 1-8
31. [The definition of a term allows the expression of its essential mean]–F
32. Taken as a whole, justice is a mean between doing injustice and suffering injustice-30-31/ 1133b 29-1134a 7
_________________________
33. [Justice is: (a) a relational virtue–Law Abidingness and (b) a proper virtue via
distribution and retribution; these together may be understood as a mean between doing
injustice and suffering injustice]–28, 29, 31
11
Aristotle’s Ethics in Eight Outlines
Though there may be instances of bestiality and insanity as reasons for evil action, in the
main, it is akrasia and asophrosune with the latter being more blameable than the former
Book Seven. Chapter 3, 1146b 15-1149b 35
1. The akrates (a + kratein, to master or rule) person is distinguished by either: a) his
concerns/desires, b) his attitudes (or inclinations) towards these concerns/desires, or c)
both (a) and (b)—A/1146b 15-18
2. The akrates person’s concerns/desires overlap with those of the asophrosune person—
F/1146b 20
3. [Whenever a property overlaps two genera, that property cannot define either genus
simpliciter]–F
4. The akrates person’s concerns/desires, simpliciter, do not define akrasia–2,3/ 1146a
20
5. The akrates person’s attitudes (or inclinations) towards his concerns/desires may
overlap the attitudes (or inclinations) of the asophrosune person—A/ 1146a 22
6. The akrates person’s attitudes (or inclinations) towards his concerns/desires do not
define akrasia–3, 5/ 1146a 21
7. The asophrosune person believes in the general principle that he should always pursue
the pleasant thing at hand—A/ 1146a 23-24
8. The akrates person does not believe in the general principle that he should always
pursue the pleasant thing at hand since he feels regret over his actions done for the sake of
the pleasant—F/ 1146a 25
9. [The akrates person and the asophrosune person differ in that their attitudes toward
the general principle (of the pleasant) differs as does the nature of their acknowledged
desire (i.e., one repudiates it while the other embraces it)]–A
10. [The distinction cited in premise #9 indicates a combination of alternatives #1a &
#1b, viz., #1c]–A
11. Alternative #1c correctly depicts the akrates person–4, 6, 7-10/1146a 19
12. Some [Socrates] say that the akrates person’s actions conflict with belief but not with
knowledge—F/ 1146a 25
12
13. Heracleitus correctly maintains, some people’s convictions about what they believe
are no weaker than other people’s convictions about what they know—A/1146a 27-32
14. [In cases in which Belief and Knowledge are subject to personal evaluation, there is
no reliable difference between the two]–A
15. The [Socratic] position falls–12-14/1146a 26
16. It does matter whether a person has knowledge of x without using it and someone
who has knowledge of x and does use it (the potentiality/actuality distinction)—A/1146a
33
17. It does matter whether a person who has knowledge of the universal does not
recognize particulars that fall under it—A/ 1147a 1-3
18. It does matter whether a person has knowledge of the universal term—A/1147a 3-9
19. It does matter if a person through incapacity (e.g., by being drunk) cannot exercise
his knowledge of either premise #17 and/or #18—A/ 1147a 10-17
20. In certain cases knowledge is relevant to akrasia–16-19/ 1147a 18-24
21. Moral Action requires that the agent have: a). knowledge about universals and
particulars, b). beliefs about a value system, c). a will to combine (a) with (b) in order to
bring about correct action—A/ 1147a 24-30
22. Sometimes in some individuals desire will impede one’s knowledge of 21a and this
will lead to action not in accord with 21b—F/1147a33-1147b
23. [Whenever one acts not in accord with his beliefs, he is akrates)–A
24. The asophrosune person is not impaired respecting 21a but has a value system (21b)
that permits the choice of the pleasant—F/1147b 1-22
25. [The akrates person differs from the asophrosune person due to aspects of
knowledge]–11,15, 20, 21-24
26. Some people are bestial (i.e., not wholly human such as a murderer of pregnant
women & canibals) and some are insane (e.g., the person who ate his mother)—F/1148b
20-30
27. [Bestiality and insanity are added, unnatural, sorts of evil behavior]–F
28. [A treatise on morality should treat what is immoral for the most part]–A
13
29. [A treatise on morality should concentrate upon akrates and asophrosune–26-28
30. Akrates is less related to reason than asophrosune—25/1149b 25-35
31. [Blame and culpability are associated with reason (through the conditions of
voluntariness)]–F
_____________________
32. Though there may be instances of bestiality and insanity as reasons for evil action, in
the main, it is akrasia and asophrosune with the latter being more blameable than the
former–25-31
14
Aristotle’s Ethics in Eight Outlines
[Friendships based upon utility or pleasure are not enduring]
Book 8. Chapter 3, 1156a 7-1156b 4
1. [The nature of causes determines the nature of the causes’ objects]—A/1156a 7
2. The three causes of friendship differ in species—A/1156a 8
3. The nature of the types of friendship differ in species–1, 2/1156a 8
4. To love for the utility of x may mean that one loves x for pleasure—F/ 1156a 13
5. To love for pleasure only is to love for utility—F/ 1156a 15
6. [To love for pleasure or utility means one loves for extrinsic reasons]–4, 5
7. [Whenever one loves for extrinsic reasons, it is not important what is the kath auto
cause of the desired extrinsic effect; only the effect is important]–A
8. When one loves for utility or pleasure one loves not the source or cause of the
pleasure–6, 7/1156a 17
9. [Whenever one loves the extrinsic effect, one’s attachment is only toward that effect]-7,8
10. [The dunamis of the “pleasure only” relationship mirrors the “utility only”
relationship]–4,5,6,8,9
11. Whenever one is engaged in a utility or a pleasure relationship, then that relationship
will continue only so long as the utility or pleasure continues–8, 9, 10/1156a 20
12. “Utility” is relative to particular needs that are evidenced at particular times—
A/1156a 23
13. Older people and those who are oriented toward the expedient seek utility
relationships—A/1156a 25
14. [What is relative to particular times and needs is not enduring]–F
15. Those who seek friendships out of utility seek that which is not enduring–1214/1156a 22 & a 29
15
16. Those who are guided primarily by their feelings seek the satisfaction of those
feelings (e.g., erotic feelings of the young)—F/1156a 33 & 1156b 1-3
17. [The satisfaction of feeling is pleasure]–A
18. Those who are guided primarily by feelings, seek friendships based upon pleasure-16, 17/1156b 4-6
19. What satisfies feelings is changeable—A/1156a 34
20. Those who seek friendships based upon pleasure seek that which is not enduring-18,19/1156b 4_______
21. [Friendships based upon utility or pleasure are not enduring]–11, 15, 20
16
Glossary of Key Greek Terms Used in Outlines
Agathos—Good, either functional or moral (opposite of kakos)
Akrasia—Not powerful; morally weak
Arete—Excellent, when applied to the quiet technai, then morally virtuous
Athlios—Truly miserable
Asophrosune—Not self-controlled. Evil or wicked.
Dunameis—Potentiali …
Purchase answer to see full
attachment

Order a unique copy of this paper
(550 words)

Approximate price: $22

Basic features
  • Free title page and bibliography
  • Unlimited revisions
  • Plagiarism-free guarantee
  • Money-back guarantee
  • 24/7 support
On-demand options
  • Writer’s samples
  • Part-by-part delivery
  • Overnight delivery
  • Copies of used sources
  • Expert Proofreading
Paper format
  • 275 words per page
  • 12 pt Arial/Times New Roman
  • Double line spacing
  • Any citation style (APA, MLA, Chicago/Turabian, Harvard)

Our guarantees

Delivering a high-quality product at a reasonable price is not enough anymore.
That’s why we have developed 5 beneficial guarantees that will make your experience with our service enjoyable, easy, and safe.

Money-back guarantee

You have to be 100% sure of the quality of your product to give a money-back guarantee. This describes us perfectly. Make sure that this guarantee is totally transparent.

Read more

Zero-plagiarism guarantee

Each paper is composed from scratch, according to your instructions. It is then checked by our plagiarism-detection software. There is no gap where plagiarism could squeeze in.

Read more

Free-revision policy

Thanks to our free revisions, there is no way for you to be unsatisfied. We will work on your paper until you are completely happy with the result.

Read more

Privacy policy

Your email is safe, as we store it according to international data protection rules. Your bank details are secure, as we use only reliable payment systems.

Read more

Fair-cooperation guarantee

By sending us your money, you buy the service we provide. Check out our terms and conditions if you prefer business talks to be laid out in official language.

Read more

Calculate the price of your order

550 words
We'll send you the first draft for approval by September 11, 2018 at 10:52 AM
Total price:
$26
The price is based on these factors:
Academic level
Number of pages
Urgency

Order your essay today and save 15% with the discount code ESSAYHELP